The Bosnian war -fought among the different ethnic groups in the current state of Bosnia and Herzegovina -took place from April 1992 until the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serbs rejected a referendum vote in favour of the country's secession from what was left of Yugoslavia. Subsequent ethnic cleansing against Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croats quickly led to a full-scale war. Zwierzchowski and Tabeau estimate the total number of fatalities and missing people at a minimum of 89,186, or two per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's 1991 population.
1 Bosniaks suffered the most, with casualties and missing persons estimated at 57,992, equating to 3.1% of their overall population. About 1 million people were displaced internally, and about 1.2 million fl ed the country as war refugees. 
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to involve (at a later stage) those Western countries that had not initially received many refugees from former Yugoslavia. This strategy turned out to be largely unsuccessful. A further concern, given the ethnic cleansing motive for the war, was the potential signal effect to warring parties of granting permanent residency immediately. It was feared that permanent residency could be seen as tacitly accepting that no return would be possible after the war.
However, after the initial period of temporary protection, the fi ve host countries differed vastly in the type of residency granted to Bosnians, their access to national labour markets and education, integration measures offered to them, and the fi nancial support they received. These differences are laid out in Dayton Agreement, the ethnic aspect of the war meant that return was often complicated. Even after the peace agreement, many internally displaced Bosnians could not, or were not willing to, return to their former homes in so-called minority areas where they feared persecution. Economic conditions for the returnees were also diffi cult, with the offi cial unemployment rate around 40% for most of the post-war period.
As a consequence, by 2005 only Germany had repatriated the vast majority of Bosnian refugees, while others had moved on to different countries ( Figure 1 ). That Bosnians left Germany -and none of the other four countries -in large numbers is likely due to the aforementioned fact that permanent residency was rarely given in Germany.
Thus, ten years after the Dayton Agreement, less than ten per cent of the initial refugee population remained in Germany. In the four other countries, the vast majority of Bosnians had settled in the countries permanently (Table 3).
At the time the Bosnian war was unfolding, the economic environment was unfavourable and quickly deteriorating in all host countries, with the possible exception of Austria. A global recession in the aftermath of the 1987 "Black Monday" stock market crash characterised much of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and Sweden in particular was going through a major economic crisis. Unemployment rates were on the rise in all fi ve countries ( Figure 2 ).
This observation is important for two reasons. First, economic variables that are subject to high short-term manent residency, allowed unrestricted access to the labour market and the Swedish education system, and offered integration measures such as language courses to refugees. The other countries fell in between those two approaches, with differences in the reception conditions refl ecting the varying levels of political willingness to host refugees.
Three years after the outbreak of the war, a peace agreement, the "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (commonly referred to as the Dayton Agreement), was signed in December 1995. The return of displaced Bosnians featured prominently in the Dayton Agreement, and all fi ve countries in this study adopted various measures to facilitate return. Despite the Germany 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 The latter group of immigrants often differs signifi cantly with respect to their success in labour markets and within education systems. Aggregating the groups, in particular when the composition can only be estimated roughly, complicates analyses.
An early insight thus emerges from this work: Internationally, there is a need for much better long-term tracking of immigrants in general and refugees in particular in order to analyse their experiences and draw conclusions for policy.
Despite these caveats, there is still considerable value in trying to extract information about integration experiences from various national data sources and comparing outcomes with those of the population of the host countries.
Apart from national sources, we also utilise the European Labour Force Survey (EULFS).
Educational attainments of Bosnians at the time of arrival
It is interesting to note that the educational attainment of Bosnians differed among countries of arrival. The level was generally slightly higher than that of other refugees arriving to Europe at the same time but still signifi cantly lower than the average educational attainments in the host countries (Figure 3 ).
Austria in particular, but also Denmark, received a disproportionally high share of low-educated Bosnian refugees compared to the average education level of the host volatility, such as productivity growth or unemployment, are not likely to be decisive in refugees' choice of destination. 4 However, these variables (if unfavourable, as was the case during the Bosnian war) do aggravate the labour market opportunities of refugees, an issue often exacerbated by priority systems.
5 Fast integration into labour markets is often seen as crucial for social integration into societies. Weak labour market conditions, and the associated low probability of employment, may also contribute to path dependencies regarding the medium-to longterm employment prospects of refugees.
Second, adverse labour market conditions may also impact the host countries' hospitality towards refugees, especially among workers within low-skilled sectors. This sentiment appears common despite recent evidence from the UK, Austria and Denmark showing that an infl ow of low-skilled refugees rarely leads to a displacement of local workers.
6 It would therefore appear that Bosnian refugees did not face very favourable conditions for either short-or long-term integration.
Labour market and integration outcomes of Bosnian refugees
We now turn to the contemporary integration outcomes of Bosnian refugees in the four host countries of interest, excluding Germany due to the small percentage of Bosnians who remained in Germany after the end of the war. Of course, taking such a long-term perspective in a country comparative study is not without its problems. There is a lack of harmonised data to draw from, and national statistical databases and labour force surveys often do not disaggregate data on former Yugoslav nationals, nor between Bosnian war refugees and those coming S h e l l m a n : Whither Will They Go? A Global Study of Refugees' Destinations, 1965 -1995 , in: International Studies Quarterly, No. 51, 2007 . 5 A priority system is an employment protection measure that usually puts temporary residence holders last. For example, in Austria, when Bosnian refugees held the legal status of aliens, they could only take up positions that could not be fi lled by Austrians, guest workers, recognised refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, labour migrants with social welfare credits or second generation aliens with at least fi ve years of schooling in Austria. See J. v a n S e l m -T h o rb u r n : Refugee Protection in Europe: Lessons of the Yugoslav Crisis, Hague, Boston, London 1998, The Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 6 C. D u s t m a n n , T. F r a t t i n i , I. 
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As shown in Figure 5 , the gap in employment rates be- It is worth noting that the data indicates that the gap in employment rates between men and women is larger for Bosnians than for natives. This is also found for other immigrant groups. 8 The employment rate difference between men and women in the Netherlands is just above ten percentage points for nationals, whereas the difference is almost 30 percentage points for Bosnians, equat- country. For Austria, which had relatively favourable labour market conditions, this seems not to have affected labour market integration outcomes, as we document below. In Denmark, where the unemployment rate in 1992 stood at nine per cent, the relatively large number of lowskilled refugees may have played a role in defi ning initial labour market outcomes.
Labour market outcomes
We fi rst turn to labour market outcomes shortly after the end of the Bosnian war. While the aggregating of all refugees from the region as "former Yugoslavian" does make it diffi cult to identify Bosnian refugees per se, it is possible to make some approximation of the true measure. The timeline of the wars in former Yugoslavia and comparisons of the total number of Yugoslav refugees with those from Bosnia suggest that immigrants from the former Yugoslavia who entered host countries from 1993 onwards are a reasonable proxy measure for Bosnian war refugees. Figure 4 shows employment rates in the different receiving countries of said group in 1998, along with those of the native-born population of the host country.
The employment rates show a very positive picture of the labour market outcomes experienced by former Yugoslav nationals in Austria, where this number had already reached 64% for recent immigrants in 1998. In all other countries of our sample, these employment rates remained subdued, between 26% (the Netherlands) and 33% (Denmark). S o u r c e : Own elaboration on EULFS data.
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outside and travelled with their parents as refugees were very young at the time. They therefore constitute a very close proxy for the educational performance of secondgeneration Bosnians.
For both male and female migrants, Bosnians are more likely to pursue tertiary education than ethnic Danes and non-Western migrants in Denmark. The situation is similar in the Netherlands, where over 40% of children to Bosnian refugees obtained a university or vocational university degree, a number above the national average. 9 According to de Boom et al., 54.9% of the former Yugoslavs aged 15-24 were enrolled in full-time education in 2007, which is on par with Dutch nationals.
10 Furthermore, Hessels reported that Yugoslav children in the Netherlands were outperforming their parents in terms of educational attainment, and most of them were enrolled in higher education. 11 We interpret this as an indication that the initial disadvantageous labour market positions may be overcome and might not necessarily lead to unfavourable education outcomes in the second generation.
Conclusions
In this study, we reviewed the integration experience of Bosnian refugees displaced during the Bosnian war in the ing to a supplemental gender gap of close to 20 percentage points. Similar gaps are found in 2014 for Sweden (more than fi ve percentage points) and Austria (around ten percentage points). While the extent differs, gender inequality in labour market integration is an issue among Bosnian refugees.
The larger variation in the employment rates of Bosnian refugees compared to the native-born population is likely a result of their relatively small sample size in the EULFS. However, Figure 5 suggests that in Austria and Sweden, the labour market performance of Bosnian refugees is very close to that of the the native-born population. Note that the employment rates could, however, be somewhat overestimated by two factors. First, a positive selfselection of those Bosnians staying in the country who found employment is likely. Second, the age composition of Bosnian refugees compared to the host countries' population is favourable. Many refugees who fl ed from the war in Bosnia were in their prime working age at the time of the studies. The fi rst concern is clearly valid, but our results nevertheless hold for those who stayed in the country. The latter is the reason we restrict the sample to 25-54 year olds.
Educational outcomes of second generation migrants
Although the evidence on labour market integration is mixed for Denmark and the Netherlands, a more positive picture emerges for young Bosnians' educational attainment in Denmark ( Figure 6 ). While not all are second generation in the strict sense of being born in the host country by immigrant parents, those who were born Lastly, it needs to be stated again that Germany never intended to host Bosnian refugees permanently, provided little integration support and returned most refugees as soon as the Dayton Agreement of 1995 marked the end of the Bosnian war.
The recent evidence we fi nd of young and second-generation Bosnian refugees' educational outcomes is promising. In both Denmark and the Netherlands, the share of this young group enrolled in tertiary education exceeds that of the native-born populations. By this metric, the integration experience has been a success.
We end by reiterating the call to policy makers of the need for better longitudinal data on integration outcomes. This is necessary not only to follow these outcomes in a descriptive way, but more importantly to be able to analyse the effects of interventions to improve integration. For third-country immigrants as a group, labour market integration is lacking in most European countries, and going forward, improving labour force participation and employment rates is of paramount importance. early 1990s. We compare reception conditions among the fi ve Western European countries that played host to the majority of refugees at the time and track their labour market experience as well as, to the extent possible, education outcomes of second generation Bosnians.
While the overall integration experience has been a success story, a number of interesting, more nuanced fi ndings emerge that may inform policymakers. In Austria, where both labour market conditions and the integration support extended towards Bosnians were relatively favourable, employment rates quickly reached those of the native-born population. In the Netherlands and Sweden, it took a little more than a decade for Bosnian refugees to catch up to the native-born population. Unfavourable initial labour market conditions may have inhibited policy efforts towards integration but did not have a long-term negative effect. In Denmark, Bosnian refugees faced difficult labour market conditions and received relatively little support upon arrival. This may have led to the observably worse employment outcomes that continue to prevail.
Despite differences in the educational attainments that Bosnians held when arriving in the host countries, we do not fi nd any association between the level of education
